FalconFeeds analyzes a leaked Kimsuky operator workstation and related VPS that exposed backdoors, source code, internal documents, browsing history, credentials, and phishing infrastructure. The attribution discussion cites Korean Standard Time configuration, a Pyongyang-hours work pattern, targeting of South Korean government and military entities, stolen Ministry of Unification GPKI certificates, and overlaps with previously reported Kimsuky domains such as nid-security[.]com and nid[.]navermails[.]com. The report describes a Deepin Linux VM whose host Windows C:\ drive was mounted into the guest, exposing passwords, manuals, browser history, and operational files. Network evidence includes a Singapore origin IP, 156.59.13[.]153, an SSH service on port 60233, a .appletls.com TLS certificate, and roughly 1,100 related relay IPs concentrated in China and Hong Kong. The findings matter because they provide unusually direct visibility into Kimsuky infrastructure, tradecraft, false-flag cues, and OPSEC failures behind South Korea-focused espionage operations.