Bored BeaverTail & InvisibleFerret Yacht Club – A Lazarus Lure Pt.2

2024-11-14 e Sentire

https://www.esentire.com/blog/bored-beavertail-invisibleferret-yacht-club-a-lazarus-lure-pt-2

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The victim in the incident eSentire responded to appears to be a software developer, which aligns with the TTPs of previously reported on campaigns by North Korean threat actors where software developers were targeted. It’s also worth noting that a total of 21 crypto extensions were targeted by the BeaverTail in our observed sample; the full list can be found in the Appendix at the end of the blog (Figure 7). It also initiates a backdoor session with the C2 server and scans and uploads sensitive files from the infected host. After the JavaScript file is loaded, it uses a cURL command to download InvisibleFerret malware components from a command and control (C2) server; in this case the C2 was located at 185[.]235[.]241[.]208[:]1224.

Indicators of Compromise

Type Value First Seen Last Seen
IPv4 185.235.241.208 2024-08-13 2025-11-13
IPv4 95.164.7.171 2024-10-14 2025-07-26

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