Quetzal Team analyzes a Famous Chollima campaign that targets cryptocurrency-themed job or training lures with ClickFix-style social engineering. The infection chain starts with a faux LinkedIn invite to a crypto training site, then a fake webcam driver issue pushes macOS victims to run a command that downloads a Bash stager, a fake Chrome-themed DriverFixerNow app, and a Go-based payload. The Go malware functions as an infostealer and RAT with modules for command execution, data exfiltration, file upload/download, hardware collection, TCP transport, and installation of a fake Chrome instance with malicious extensions. The researchers link the command dictionary to PyLangGhostRAT/GoLangGhostRAT lineage and identify C2 and payload infrastructure including kit-haus[.]net, 144.172.93.88, 157.250.195.237, transfer/upload endpoints, and several SHA-256 hashes. The case is notable because it shows DPRK-linked operators adapting ClickFix delivery and Go malware while reusing recognizable RAT configuration patterns.