Wav3 examines how defenders can detect obfuscated PiKVM and TinyPilot KVM-over-IP devices in endpoint telemetry, noting that North Korean state-sponsored actors have shown interest in similar remote-access hardware. The article focuses on CrowdStrike USB events, especially DcUsbConfigurationDescriptor and DcUsbDeviceConnected records, and correlates them through DeviceDescriptorSetHash and agent ID to identify Raspberry Pi-based HID devices even when user-facing device details are altered. It highlights configuration strings such as “Config 1: PiKVM device” and “Config 1: ECM device,” interface counts, power draw, and related HDMI monitor artifacts such as Linux display identifiers. The defensive value is practical: unauthorized KVM devices can support remote-work fraud and covert operator access, so endpoint teams need device-level hunting beyond ordinary user interviews or asset policy checks.