Wiper Malware – A Detection Deep Dive
2014-12-17 • Cisco Talos •
Cisco Talos analyzed a wiper malware variant to improve network detection for beaconing behavior from the disk-wiping component. The team examined related samples, modified hard-coded command-and-control addresses to a local decoy environment, and shortened sleep delays to capture traffic during debugging. Analysis showed the beacon payload included a null-terminated opening parenthesis, the infected host's local IP address, the first 15 bytes of the hostname, stack-derived bytes, and other hard-coded payload elements that varied by Windows version. Talos revised its detection rule to alert on hard-coded portions of the beacon payload rather than relying on environment-specific stack artifacts. The finding matters because wipers can both destroy data and impede incident response, so robust behavioral detection is needed before destructive activity spreads.
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | First Seen | Last Seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| HASH | e2ecec43da974db02f624ecadc94baf… | 2014-12-17 | 2023-05-02 |
| HASH | 0753f8a7ae38fdb830484d0d737f975… | 2014-12-17 | 2020-03-09 |
| IPv4 | 58.185.154.99 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |
| IPv4 | 212.31.102.100 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |
| IPv4 | 217.96.33.164 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |
| IPv4 | 200.87.126.116 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |
| IPv4 | 203.131.222.102 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |
| IPv4 | 88.53.215.64 | 2014-12-04 | 2014-12-28 |